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ARGUMENT
The arguments of defendants/appellants International Confections Company,
NG Acquisition, and Michael Ryan show that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in denying the motion for relief from the judgment approving the
receivership sale.

The case no longer existed after plaintiff TAB’s voluntary

dismissal, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed.

Alternatively,

proceeding forward after counsel for International Confections, NG, and Ryan
withdrew violated Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c), and International Confections, NG, and
Ryan could not respond to the receiver’s motion under the circumstances. Thus,
the trial court should have granted the motion for relief based on Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1), (b)(4), and (b)(6).
As explained below, none of the arguments by appellants Mrs. Fields
Confections or Bank of American Fork overcomes the fundamental flaws that the
trial court proceeded in a nonexistent case and in violation of Rule 74(c).
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision below.
I.

Bank of American Fork waived its arguments by not presenting them in
the trial court.
As an initial matter, the Court should not consider any of the arguments

Appellee Bank of American Fork raises in its brief. Bank of American Fork did
not present any of these arguments to the trial court. Rather, in response to the
Rule 60(b) motion, Bank of American Fork filed an “objection” consisting of six
1

paragraphs of its description of facts it claimed justified denying the motion. (R.
1164–1167.) Bank of American Fork offered no legal analysis or citations to any
authority.
In Mule-Hide Products Co. v. White, this Court held that an appellee may
not attempt to raise an issue for the first time on appeal:
Appellee, for the first time on appeal, attempts to raise
the issues of equitable estoppel, apparent agency, and
laches. However, appellee failed to present these
arguments to the court below and, therefore, may not
raise these issues on appeal. See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d
656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). “Failure to raise the point
[below] precludes its consideration here.” Id. at 661.
Appellee also alludes to attorney fees on appeal in its
statement of issues but its brief contains no analysis.
“Under ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not
consider an issue ... raised for the first time on appeal
unless the trial court committed plain error.” State v.
Helmick, 2000 UT 70, ¶ 8, 9 P.3d 164.
Mule-Hide Products Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, fn. 5, 40 P.3d 1155.
The majority of the arguments Bank of American Fork raises in its brief are
already addressed in Mrs. Fields’ brief. But as to the few points that only appear in
Bank of American Fork’s brief (explained in more detail below), the Court should
not consider them.
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II.

TAB’s notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice terminated the case
and the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
A.

Mrs. Fields’ res judicata argument fails.

Mrs. Fields Confections argues that res judicata bars International
Confections, NG, and Ryan’s Rule 60(b) motion because the court considered and
determined its subject matter jurisdiction.

(Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 19-21.)

This

argument fails because res judicata does not apply in direct attacks to jurisdiction
in the same case, and because the trial court did not adjudicate its jurisdiction.
1.

The Rule 60(b) motion was a direct attack, not a collateral
one, so res judicata does not apply.

In arguing that res judicata applies, Mrs. Fields Confections mischaracterizes
the Rule 60(b) motion as a collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction. (Mrs.
Fields’ Br. at 19.) The Utah Supreme Court has held that an attempt to deny the
legal and binding effect of a judgment in a proceeding with a purpose other than
voiding the judgment is a collateral attack.

In contrast, an attempt to void a

judgment in a manner provided by law to accomplish that object is a direct attack:
A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to
correct it, or to void it, in some manner provided by law
to accomplish that object. It is an “attack, * * * by
appropriate proceedings between the parties to it
seeking, for sufficient cause alleged, to have it annulled,
reversed, vacated or declared void.” Pope v. Harrison,
16 Lea, 84 Tenn., 82, 90. If the suit or proceeding is
instituted for the very purpose of setting aside,
correcting, or modifying the judgment, it is usually
regarded as a direct attack. When the attack upon the
3

judgment is not incidental to the object of the proceeding,
and the end of the proceeding is not something collateral
to the judgment, the attack is direct; while a denial of the
legal and binding effect of a judgment in a proceeding
not instituted for the purpose of annulling or changing it,
or of enjoining its execution, is characterized as a
collateral attack upon it. Mosby v. Gisborn, 17 Utah 257,
54 P. 121. A direct attack is an action or motion for the
specific and primary purpose of setting aside or annulling
the judgment; and any action which has for its purpose
the accomplishment of any other relief than the setting
aside or modifying of the judgment is not a direct attack.
Wayne v. Brumley, 190 Ky. 488, 227 S.W. 996. When the
direct purpose and aim of the proceeding is to attain
relief other than the setting aside or modifying of the
judgment, and the attack upon the judgment is involved
merely incidentally, the attack is collateral. Cohen v.
Portland Lodge No. 142, B. P. O. E., 152 F. 357, 81
C.C.A. 483; Cohee v. Baer, 134 Ind. 375, 32 N.E. 920,
39 Am.St.Rep. 270.
Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 P.2d 157, 160 (1938) (emphasis added; asterisks
sic).
Based on this distinction, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Watts v.
Pinckney that a motion to vacate judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) was a
direct attack, not a collateral one. There, plaintiff Watts sued defendant Pinckney
for damage to a houseboat. Pinckney filed a third-party claim against the United
States, and Watts filed an amended complaint to join the United States as a
defendant. The district court entered judgment for Watts against Pinckney and the
United States. The United States appealed, but Pinckney paid the judgment and
did not appeal. Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 407.
4

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Watts’ claim lied solely
against the United States. On remand, the district court determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and dismissed the complaint. Seven
months later, Pinckney—who had paid the Watts’ judgment against him and who
had not appealed from the judgment—moved to vacate the judgment as void under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), and requested that the court order restitution of the funds he
had paid to satisfy the judgment. The district court granted Pinckney’s motion. Id.
at 408.
Watts appealed and argued that Pinckney could not bring his motion because
res judicata precludes a collateral attack on a court’s determination of its own
jurisdiction. Id. at 410. Relying on the above-quoted language from Intermill v.
Nash, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because an attack under Rule 60(b)
is direct, not collateral:
Pinckney’s attack on the judgment was direct, not
collateral. A direct attack is defined as follows:
A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an
attempt to correct it, or to void it, in some
manner provided by law to accomplish that
object. It is an attack ... by appropriate
proceedings between the parties to it
seeking, for sufficient cause alleged, to have
it annulled, reversed, vacated or declared
void.
1B J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.407 at 282 n.
1, quoting Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 P.2d 157.

5

The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
direct attacks on judgments. “Res judicata does not
preclude a litigant from making a direct attack [under
Rule 60(b)] upon the judgment before the court which
rendered it.” Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d at 710, quoting
1B J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.407 at 931
(2d ed. 1973).
Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (brackets and emphasis in
original).

The court concluded that Pinckney could move to set aside the

unappealed judgment and recover the amount he had paid. Because the judgment
was void, it was a “legal nullity” and the “district court was compelled to exercise
its authority under Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the judgment against Pinckney.” Id.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas also
recognized the same rule in In re Acorn Hotels. It held, “A Rule 60(b)(4) motion
is, by definition, not a collateral attack. It is a direct attack, brought in the same
case and before the same court that entered the offending judgment.” In re Acorn
Hotels, LLC, 251 B.R. 696, 700 (W.D. Tex. Bankr. 2000) (emphasis in original).
Because a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is a direct attack in the same case, res judicata
does not apply:
Just as res judicata will foreclose a challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction in the context of a collateral attack on
a judgment, the reverse is true in the context of a “direct
attack”—the lack of basis for subject matter jurisdiction
may render the resulting judgment void, permitting it to
be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), even though the
jurisdictional challenge might not have been made at

6

trial, and res judicata cannot be raised as a bar to such a
direct challenge.
Id. at 700–01. In other words, “Res judicata, an affirmative defense that has as its
touchstone the principle of finality of judgments, can have no application in a Rule
60(b) action, the very purpose of which is to accord to trial courts an equitable
exception to the normal rules of finality.” Id. at 701 (emphasis in original). See
also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments, § 747 (“An attack on a judgment in proceedings
based on equitable relief as allowed by rule or law constitutes a direct attack and is
not a barred collateral attack. . . . Thus, for example, a complaint to set aside a
judgment alleged to be void is a direct and not a collateral attack upon the
judgment.”
In addition to these authorities, common sense supports the notion that a
litigant may challenge a court’s jurisdiction through a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. A
lack of jurisdiction is one of the few reasons that a judgment could be void. “‘If
the underlying judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court
to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).’” Antoine
v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. v. Indoor
Cultivation Equipment, 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.1995)). “A judgment is void
under 60(b)(4) ‘if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of
law.’” Id. (quoting In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir.1992)). It would
7

render Rule 60(b)(4) meaningless if res judicata prevented a litigant from
challenging subject matter jurisdiction by a motion under that rule.
In sum, because International Confections, NG, and Ryan’s Rule 60(b)(4)
motion was a direct attack on the trial court’s judgment, res judicata does not
apply.
2.

Res judicata could not apply here in any event because the
trial court did not adjudicate its jurisdiction.

Res judicata could not apply here in any event because the trial court did not
adjudicate its jurisdiction. In its five pages of argument about res judicata, Mrs.
Fields Confections does not offer a single Record citation to a decision by the trial
court adjudicating its jurisdiction. That is because the trial court never made one.
Res judicata will not bar a later argument on subject matter jurisdiction
when the court assumed it had jurisdiction instead of actually adjudicating the
question. In Lilly v. Lilly, a party sought to attack the subject matter jurisdiction of
a California court that adjudicated the same issues in a prior case. This Court held
that res judicata did not bar the attack because “although raised before the
California court, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was not adjudicated.” Lilly
v. Lilly, 2011 UT App 53, ¶¶ 28–29, 250 P.3d 994. In the prior case, one of the
parties objected to the California court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In response,
the California court considered personal jurisdiction, but did not expressly
determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.
8

Id. at ¶ 29. This Court

explained that the res judicata question depends on whether the prior court
assumed jurisdiction or expressly adjudicated it:
The critical inquiry is therefore whether the issue of
jurisdiction was fully and fairly litigated and finally
decided in the court which rendered the competing
judgment. In conducting such an analysis, a distinction
must be recognized between the mere assumption of
jurisdiction by the foreign court and a recital to that
effect, as contrasted with an express adjudication on the
subject after the issue has been raised.
Id. at ¶ 28. Although Lilly v. Lilly involved a prior foreign case and judgment, the
Court should apply the same rule to this case because due process of law—which
necessarily applies regardless of whether prior proceedings occurred in another
state or in the same one—drives the ability to question jurisdiction in an earlier
proceeding. Fullenwider Co. v. Patterson, 611 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1980) (“It is
fundamental that the courts of each state shall give full faith and credit to valid
judgments rendered in a sister state. However, this does not preclude the court of
the forum state from examining into the question of jurisdiction of the foreign state
when that question is properly raised. This is so because due process of law
requires the acquisition of jurisdiction as a prerequisite to the validity of any
judgment.” (emphasis added)).
The trial court never determined its jurisdiction after TAB’s notice of
voluntary dismissal, but proceeded with the case after the dismissal “[b]ased on the
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agreement of the parties.” (R. 780 (Dec. 11, 2014 entry).) Thus, even if the Rule
60(b) motion constituted a collateral attack, res judicata could not apply because
the court never adjudicated its subject matter jurisdiction.
B.

The trial court’s proceeding in a non-existent matter renders its
judgment void.

International Confections, NG, and Ryan’s consent to ongoing proceedings
does not amount to a waiver of jurisdiction because parties can never waive lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or establish subject matter jurisdiction by consent or
estoppel. See In Re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 25, 266 P.3d 702
(“Because subject matter jurisdiction goes to the heart of a court’s authority to hear
a case, it is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, even if first raised
on appeal.”); see also State ex rel. D.M., 2005 UT App 420 (subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be asserted at any time); Harris v. Billings,
16 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1405 (Cal. App. 1993) (holding that party’s participation in
case after voluntary dismissal did not waive later objection to subject matter
jurisdiction because voluntary dismissal deprived court of subject matter
jurisdiction and “[s]uch jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or
estoppel.”).
Mrs. Fields Confections argues that the trial court’s proceeding after the
dismissal was not a bad enough jurisdictional error to make its judgment void.
(Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 22–23.)

But this case did not involve a mere erroneous
10

interpretation of a statute defining jurisdiction. Rather, it involved a court taking
action and entering judgment when no case existed. No party disputes that Utah
courts only have authority to act in a pending case. And no party disputes that a
proper notice of voluntary dismissal terminates a pending case. Thus, there was
not even an arguable basis for jurisdiction.
Mrs. Fields Confections also argues that the judgment was not void because
subject matter jurisdiction is “the authority of the court to hear the case” and that
Utah district courts have jurisdiction “in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted
in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.” (Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 26 (citing
Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 8, 234 P.3d 1100 and Utah Code Ann. § 78A5-102(1).) Mrs. Fields focuses on the wrong part of the statute. The question is
not whether district courts generally have authority to hear civil matters involving
receivers. The question is whether a “matter” exists at all after a proper notice of
dismissal.
Utah law is clear on this point: it does not. Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT
App 56, ¶ 24, 975 P.2d 481, 489 (when a party has complied with Rule 41(a)(1),
“no case in controversy exists any longer and, hence, the court would lack
jurisdiction to proceed any further with the action”); Phoenix Indemn. Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 2002 UT 49, ¶3, 48 P.3d 976, 978 (“A voluntary dismissal without
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prejudice renders the proceedings a nullity and leaves the parties as if the action
had never been brought.”)
Because a voluntary dismissal terminates the matter, any proceedings after a
voluntary dismissal are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Because
Safeguard filed its notice of voluntary dismissal before Hoeffel filed an answer or a
motion for summary judgment, the voluntary dismissal must be given effect. The
district court’s orders and judgments filed after September 25, 1989, are, therefore,
void for want of jurisdiction.”); Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, PC v.
Babakaeva, 375 F. App’x 349, 350 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Babakaeva did not file an
answer or a motion for summary judgment prior to the filing of the Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice. Therefore, the voluntary dismissal became effective upon
filing of the notice with the clerk of the district court. At that point, the action
terminated, and the district court was divested of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
district court was without authority to conduct the hearing or to enter the order
Babakaeva seeks to appeal, and that order is void.” (internal citations omitted));
Netwig v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 375 F.3d 1009, 1011 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The filing
of a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice itself closes the file.”).
In sum, a district court only has subject matter jurisdiction over a pending
matter. Because a voluntary dismissal terminates a matter and renders it a nullity,

12

a district court has no subject matter jurisdiction after the dismissal. Johnson v.
Johnson and Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 did not involve district
courts taking action after a voluntary dismissal, so Mrs. Fields’ reliance on them is
misplaced.
C.

TAB’s voluntary dismissal terminated the case and rendered all
further proceedings a nullity.
1.

The creditors had not intervened as plaintiffs before TAB’s
dismissal.

Mrs. Fields argues that the presence of intervening creditors prevented
TAB’s voluntary dismissal.

(Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 23–25.)

Mrs. Fields also

mischaracterizes Rule 41(a) as requiring that “all parties consent to dismissal[.]”
(Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 25.) Not so. Only a “plaintiff” needs to consent to a notice of
dismissal. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). The authorities Mrs. Fields cites on pages 24
and 25 of its brief do not apply here because they involved cases with multiple
plaintiffs.
Mrs. Fields argues that International Confections, NG, and Ryan’s
stipulation to the motion to intervene and failure to appeal from the order granting
intervention made TAB’s dismissal invalid. (Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 24.) But that
would only matter if the creditors moved to intervene as plaintiffs and then actually
intervened as plaintiffs by filing pleadings (i.e., complaints) as Rule 24(c) requires.
They did not. The creditors in this case specifically chose not to file complaints
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and not to identify themselves as plaintiffs in their motion to intervene or proposed
order granting it.

The trial court’s December 11, 2014 order substituting the

creditors as plaintiffs makes this clear; the creditors would not have to substitute as
plaintiffs if they were already plaintiffs.

(R. 780.)

That order was a nullity,

however, because it came after TAB, the only plaintiff at the time, filed its
voluntary dismissal.
The decision to dismiss an action under Rule 41(a)(1) belongs exclusively to
plaintiffs.

Because the creditors chose not to intervene as plaintiffs, they

consciously gave up the right to prevent a voluntary dismissal of the action. TAB
was the only plaintiff when it filed its voluntary dismissal. That dismissal meant
there was no pending matter, and any proceedings after the dismissal are a nullity.
2.

International Confections, NG, and Ryan had not
responded to TAB’s complaint before TAB’s dismissal.

Bank of American Fork argues that International Confections, NG, and Ryan
responded to the complaint, preventing TAB’s dismissal. (Bank’s Br. at 6–8.)
Bank of American Fork has waived this argument and the Court should not
consider it. See Mule-Hide Products Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, fn. 5, 40 P.3d
1155. But the argument lacks merit in any event. Rule 41 allows the plaintiff to
dismiss a case “without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint
permitted under these rules.” Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). The referenced “rules” are,
14

of course the Rules of Civil Procedure. And the only responses to a complaint that
the Rules of Civil Procedure permit are answers, counterclaims, and Rule 12
motions. The Civil Rules do not permit a notice of appearance by counsel and a
memorandum in opposition to a plaintiff’s motion to serve as responses to a
complaint. Accordingly, International Confections, NG, and Ryan had not served
an “answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules,” and
TAB could voluntarily dismiss the case by notice.
3.

The appointment of a receiver did not prevent TAB’s
dismissal.

Bank of American Fork argues that the appointment of a receiver prevented
TAB’s voluntary dismissal.

Again, Bank of American Fork has waived this

argument and the Court should not consider it. Even so, the argument fails. Bank
of American Fork asks this Court to read a provision into the Rules of Civil
Procedure that does not appear there. Neither Rule 41 nor any other Civil Rule
provides that appointment of a receiver affects a plaintiff’s unilateral right to
dismiss a case by notice. Rule 41(a)(2)—which covers dismissal by order of
court—makes clear that dismissal by court order is required only if the plaintiff
does not file a timely notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1).
What is more, the Civil Rules contain a rule on receiverships: Rule 66. That
rule does not say that Rule 41(a)(1) ceases to apply when a court appoints a
receiver. This is in contrast to some other jurisdictions that specifically prohibit
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dismissal without a court order if the court has appointed a receiver. See, e.g.,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A) (noting voluntary dismissal rule is subject to Rule 66)
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 66 (“An action in which a receiver has been appointed may be
dismissed only by court order.”); see also Nev.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) (noting that
voluntary dismissal rule is subject to Rule 66) and Nev.R.Civ.P. 66 (“An action
wherein a receiver has been appointed shall not be dismissed except by order of the
court.”). If Utah’s Civil Rules prohibited dismissal by notice where a court has
appointed a receiver, they would say so. Bank of American Fork claims these
jurisdictions’ rules merely state what is already inherently true, but cites no
authority for this conclusory assertion and no authority (Utah or otherwise) holding
that Rule 41(a)(1) does not apply in receivership cases.
Bank of American Fork’s reliance on Shaw v. Robison is misplaced. The
court in Shaw appointed a receiver after the plaintiff had responded to the
complaint. Shaw v. Robison, 537 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1975). The plaintiff and
defendant in Shaw reached a settlement that was subject to court approval. Id. at
489. In contrast, the resolution between TAB, International Confections, NG, and
Ryan in this case did not require court approval. And unlike in this case, the
parties in Shaw moved the court to terminate the receivership. Id. A motion means
that the court had to take further action before terminating the receivership or
dismissing the case, and that the court had discretion to deny it. In contrast, a
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notice of dismissal is self-effectuating and immediately terminates the case without
further action from the court.
In sum, the appointment of the receiver did not preclude TAB’s notice of
dismissal.
III.

Proceeding after counsel’s withdrawal violated Rule 74(c).
Mrs. Fields argues that Rule 74’s moratorium on proceedings did not apply

because the notice of withdrawal by International Confections’ former counsel did
not contain International Confections’ address or a statement that no motion was
pending and no trial or hearing set. (Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 28–29.) At most, this is a
technical deficiency, not a substantive one. International Confections’ counsel did
not, for example, attempt to withdraw without court permission with a motion
pending or a hearing or trial set.

And the omitted information was readily

available to the other parties’ counsel from the Court’s record.

International

Confections, NG, and Ryan have cited case law holding that substantial
compliance with attorney withdrawal procedures is sufficient to entitle the party to
the rule’s benefits. (Appellants’ Br. at 34 (citing Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581,
582 (Utah 1984)). In contrast, Mrs. Fields cites no authority holding that counsel’s
failure to include a client’s address on a notice of withdrawal deprives the
unrepresented client of the benefit of Rule 74(c).
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Mrs. Fields further argues that the adverse parties did not have to comply
with Rule 74(c) because attorney James continued to receive notice of pleadings
and hearings after his withdrawal. (Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 29-30.) But that makes no
difference.

Attorney James had withdrawn and the trial court and all parties

acknowledged that. When an attorney withdraws from a matter, the attorney no
longer acts as counsel of record.

That notices may continue to be sent

electronically to that attorney bears no relevance under Rule 74(c).
Mrs. Fields also argues that the trial court’s order approving the purchase
agreement triggers the “unless otherwise ordered by the court” exception in Rule
74(c). (Mrs. Fields’ Br., 29–30.) But the trial court’s order did not mention Rule
74(c). This exception can only apply when a Court specifically addresses the rule.
Otherwise, any order entered in violation of the rule would eliminate the rule by
implication, and the exception would swallow the rule.
Finally, Mrs. Fields argues that Rule 74(c) did not apply because
International Confections, NG, and Ryan were aware of the receivership
proceedings before their counsel withdrew. (Mrs. Fields’ Br., 30–31.) But Rule
74(c) contains no exception when a party has knowledge of proceedings before
counsel’s withdrawal (as all parties in a case would).
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The trial court abused its discretion in not vacating the judgment for the
adverse parties’ failure to comply with Rule 74(c).1
IV.

International Confections, NG, and Ryan showed excusable neglect
based on the record.
Mrs. Fields claims that International Confections, NG, and Ryan base their

excusable neglect argument on an unsupported version of the facts. (Mrs. Fields ’
Br. at 31.) To the contrary, International Confections, NG, and Ryan relied on
record evidence in the form of undisputed proceedings in the Court below.
(Appellants’ Br. at 37–38.)

The proceedings showed that International

Confections, NG, and Ryan’s counsel withdrew, that the adverse parties and trial
court did not comply with Rule 74(c), that the receiver filed an expedited motion to
approve an asset purchase agreement (but did not include the agreement), that the
receiver made no effort to serve the motion on the unrepresented defendants, and
that the receiver sought approval of the purchase agreement at a hearing three
business days later.

International Confections, NG, and Ryan’s inability to

1

Mrs. Fields chides International Confections, NG, and Ryan’s opening brief for
not breaking out its Rule 74(c) argument to parrot the three paragraphs the trial
court used in its analysis on this issue. (R. 1458–59.) But International
Confections, NG, and Ryan argued that Rule 74 (c) applied, that attorney James’
withdrawal complied with the rule, that the rule required an immediate
moratorium, and that International Confections, NG, and Ryan suffered the
prejudice that the Rule 74(c) was meant to prevent. These arguments apply to all
of the trial court’s reasoning.
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respond to the receiver’s motion under these circumstances demonstrate excusable
neglect.
V.

The requested relief is not moot.
Mrs. Fields argues that the Court should dismiss this appeal for mootness.

(Mrs. Fields’ Br. at 33–39.) Mrs. Fields already raised this argument in its motion
for summary disposition, which the Court denied. The Court should reject this
argument again.
Mrs. Fields argues that because this case involves property sold at a
receivership sale, this appeal cannot provide a meaningful remedy and is moot.
Not true. As an initial matter, because the judgment is void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, Mrs. Fields’ mootness argument cannot prevent this appeal.
“A showing of a lack of jurisdiction, in other words, could never be futile, as a
jurisdictional defect is enough by itself to void the judgment.” Judson v. Wheeler
RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 456.
What is more, equitable mootness does not apply here because International
Confections, NG, and Ryan do not ask to recover the property sold by the receiver.
Instead, they intend only to enforce their legal rights—specifically, those of
International Confections—in

the

License

Agreement

with

Mrs.

Fields

Franchising. Ryan, International Confections’ sole member, has stated as much
under oath. (R. 1036 (Ryan Affid., ¶ 12).)
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The fact that property has been sold at a receivership sale does not render an
appeal of the denial of a 60(B) motion moot where, as here, the movant/appellant
seeks something other than to prevent the transfer of property. In relying primarily
on Richards v. Baum, Mrs. Fields ignores the Utah Supreme Court decision that
Baum said controlled the outcome—Franklin Financial v. New Empire
Development Co. See Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1996) (holding
that Franklin Financial “anticipated the issue in the present case and directed a
resolution in accord with our holding”). In Franklin Financial, the seller of an
apartment house sued to foreclose on a contract of sale and recover amounts due
on the contract and some promissory notes. Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d 1040,
1042 (Utah 1983). The plaintiff/seller won summary judgment in the trial court,
the property was sold, and the seller retained all sale proceeds. Some junior
lienholders appealed, challenging the seller’s priority and claiming a share of the
sale proceeds. Id.
On appeal, the seller argued that the appeal was moot because the
foreclosure sale had occurred and the period of redemption had passed. Id. at
1043.

The Utah Supreme Court explained, “An appeal is moot if during the

pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated,
thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.” Id. “Thus,
if appellants were seeking on this appeal to prevent the foreclosure sale, and
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because of their failure to obtain a stay of execution, the sale was legally carried
out during the pendency of the appeal and the time for redemption had run, the
appeal would be moot.” Id. The court held that the appeal was not moot because
the appellants sought “not to prevent the sale, but to establish their right to a share
of the sale proceeds. That relief could be granted even though the sale is already
completed and the time for redemption has elapsed.” Id.
Similarly to Franklin Financial, courts from other jurisdictions have
recognized that a receivership sale does not moot an appeal because an appellant
may seek a remedy other than preventing the sale of assets. See, e.g., Horvath v.
Packo, 985 N.E. 2d 966, 972 (Ohio App. 2013) (“Even if we were to decide the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Horvath’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion, and
even if the receivership assets are no longer available pursuant to R.C. 2325.03
because they have been sold to a bona fide purchaser, Horvath would still be
entitled to monetary relief from the proceeds of the asset sale.”); U.S. v. Melot, 606
Fed.Appx. 930, 932 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f it is not impossible for the court to grant
some measure of relief, the appeal is not moot.”) (holding that appeal from order
confirming judicial sale was not moot though sale had been completed because
possibility of some remedy other than preventing the sale existed). 2

2

While outside of the receivership context, in Watts v. Pinckney (discussed in
Section II.A.1 above), the Ninth Circuit vacated a judgment for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction even though the defendant never appealed the judgment,
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Here, as in Franklin Financial and other cases finding appeals after a sale of
property are not moot, appellants do not seek to prevent a sale of any property or to
recover property that has already been transferred. Instead, appellants seek relief
from judgment so that International Confections may enforce its contract rights
against Mrs. Fields Franchising.
Because defendants seek something other than to prevent the sale of
property already sold, the primary Utah case on which Mrs. Fields relies —
Richards v. Baum—does not apply here. In Baum, the plaintiffs brought an action
to quiet title, seeking only specific performance of a real estate sale contract. The
seller defendants counterclaimed seeking a decree quieting title in their favor. The
trial court found for the defendants. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal but did
not obtain a stay of the judgment. While the appeal was pending, the defendants
sold the property. Baum, 914 P.2d at 720.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court applied the unremarkable rule that if an
appellant does not obtain a stay of the judgment and the only relief possible
becomes unavailable as a result, the appeal becomes moot.

Because the

plaintiff/appellant sought specific performance of the real estate sale contract as its
only relief in the trial court, and because the defendant/appellee sold the property

actually paid the judgment, and waited for seven months after a judgment against a
co-defendant had been overturned to file a motion to vacate.
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and no longer had an interest in it, it would have been impossible to grant specific
performance even if the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at
720-21.

The appellants argued that the appeal was not moot because if the

Supreme Court reversed the judgment, the trial court could award damages on
remand. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the appellants—who
were the plaintiffs below—never requested damages in their complaint.

The

Supreme Court refused to examine the case based on the theoretical possibility of
future amendments to the complaint on remand, instead reviewing the action in its
then-present form. Id. at 721-22.
This case is different from Baum. There, the sale of property to a third party
mooted the appeal because the only relief the plaintiffs/appellants had requested
was sale of the property to them. In contrast, the appellants here were defendants
in the trial court below. There was no specific remedy for them to demand at the
trial court. Indeed, the receivership sale occurred even before the defendants filed
an answer to Transportation Alliance Bank’s complaint. Further, in their Rule
60(b) motion, defendants do not seek the return of property already sold to third
parties. Instead, defendants seek only the ability to enforce the License Agreement
against Mrs. Fields.
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As with Baum, none of the other cases on which Mrs. Fields relies applies
here, because each case involved an appellant seeking to prevent the transfer of
property that was already transferred:
 Kellch v. Westland Minerals Corp., 484 P.2d 726 (Utah 1971) (trial
court ordered defendant to issue free trading stock to plaintiffs;
defendants did not obtain a stay of the judgment and plaintiffs
transferred the subject stock).
 Capri Sunshine, LLC v. E&C Fox Investments, LLC, 2015 UT App.
231 ¶9 (portion of appeal arguing that trial court erred in denying
preliminary injunction to stop sale of property was moot because sale
had already occurred).
 BV Lending, LLC v. Jordanelle Special Service Dist., 2015 UT App
117, ¶16 (appellant’s effort to challenge validity of special service
district assessment was moot because service district had foreclosed
on property so that appellant no longer owed the assessment).
 Masonry Arts, Inc. v. Mobile County Com’n, 628 So.2d 334 (Ala.
1993) (unsuccessful bidder for public contract sought only injunctive
relief; bidder’s appeal became moot because bidder did not obtain stay
of judgment and contract was awarded to different bidder and
performance had begun).
 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Grand River Dam Authority, 720 P.2d
713 (Okla. 1986) (unsuccessful bidder’s appeal from denial of
injunction was moot because bidder’s failure to obtain stay allowed
another bidder to begin performance on contract).
 U.S. v. Alder Creek Water Co., 823 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1987)
(appellants sought to set aside receivership and return property to
company after numerous changes affecting property, including hiring
legal compliance consultants, selling bonds to finance acquisition,
compliance agreement with EPA, water quality testing, and
implementation financing and long-term improvements).
This appeal is not moot because defendants are not seeking to prevent the
transfer of property that already occurred. If this Court reverses the trial court,
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defendants will have meaningful relief because setting aside the judgment that
imposed the broad release clause on defendants will allow International
Confections to enforce its contract rights against Mrs. Fields Franchising. 3
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Fields and Bank of American Fork have failed to refute International
Confections, NG, and Ryan’s arguments. The trial court erred and abused its
discretion in denying relief from judgment, and this Court should reverse the denial
of the motion. Because TAB’s notice of dismissal deprived the trial court of
subject matter jurisdiction, this Court should vacate the order approving the
receivership sale and order the trial court to dismiss the case.

Alternatively,

because International Confections, NG, and Ryan’s counsel withdrew before the
receiver filed his motion to approve the sale, this Court should vacate the order
approving the receivership sale and remand for further proceedings.

3

Contrary to Mrs. Fields’ unsupported assertion that the defendant companies “are
no more,” the receivership sale took only the form of an asset purchase. And it
excluded certain assets from the sale. International Confections’ License
Agreement with Mrs. Fields Franchising was not sold.
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